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A lot of research has been achieved on Hazmat transportation routing problems in order to minimize risk-related costs which is 
consequence of a natural accident. As the terrorist threat is growing, Hazmat shipment has became a new target of terrorist 
attacks, it is therefore necessary to consider the terrorist threat into the Hazmat routing model. In this work, we consider the 
following hazmat transportation scheduling problem in traffic engineering: a hazmat shipment has to be shipped over a road 
transportation network in order to transport a given amount of hazardous materials from a specific origin point to a specific 
destination point every day. We design a route to minimize the risks from the natural accident and the uncertainty of a terrorist 
threat, and develop a fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming method to deal with multiple uncertainties presented in terms of 
fuzzy sets, interval values and random variables which representing the probabilities and fatality rates of the terrorist attacking.
Finally, it illustrates the methodology on a case study.
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1. INSTRODUCTION
Hazardous materials (hazmat) are integral to industrialized societies, and in almost all instances originate at a 
location other than their destination. Approximately 4 billions of hazardous materials (hazmat) tons move daily 
through the world, and more than 2 billion tons of hazmat (of which 65% are carried by truck and rail) are being 
transported yearly in China. Routing is a critical factor to consider in hazmat logistics. Although the number of 
fatalities per year due to hazmat-related traffic accidents is almost negligible as compared to the annual number of 
deaths in ordinary traffic accidents, hazmat risks are considered unacceptable, the public is very sensitive to the 
dangers of hazmat transportation activity. After the September 11 attacks, the terrorist threat is growing around the 
world, Hazmat shipment has became a new target of terrorist attacks, it is therefore necessary to develop a Hazmat 
routing model with consideration of the terrorist threat, which provide guidance to state and local governments 
regarding which highway facilities might be restricted (for which materials and under which conditions) is a 
challenging but important activity. The indispensability of hazmat to modern society implies that such accidents 
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cannot be avoided, and hence researchers have focused on developing risk assessment and mitigation strategies.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Highway transportation of hazmat has received a lot of attention over the past two decades, wherein most of the 
work focused on risk assessment and route selection (Erkut, Tjandra, & Verter, 2007).
In literatures, the risk imposed by the transportation of hazardous materials is expressed by the product of the 
probability of an accident timing the measure of its consequences. Therefore, the risk minimization in hazardous 
materials transportation can be accomplished both by minimizing the hazardous materials accident probability and 
the reduction of the accidents impacts. The consideration of risk as a criterion for selecting hazardous materials
routes contributes substantially to the reduction of accident probability and the severity of the accidents impacts. 
The consideration of risk as a criterion for selecting hazardous materials routes contributes substantially to the 
reduction of accident probability and the severity of the accidents impacts.
One of the main issues of hazmat shipments is hazmat routing problem. There are a lot of works be done in this 
area. Chin and Paul lay out a bicriterion problem that minimizes the distance traveled and the population at risk 
within a fixed band width along the path. Gopalan etc. focus on development and analysis of a model to generate an 
equitable set of routes for hazardous material transportation.  Lindner-Dutton etc. follow-up on the observation that 
risk equity between these zones is achieved only after all the shipments are done. Kalelkar and Brooks use decision 
analysis in optimizing choices regarding material transportation. Kara and Verter pose the hazmat network design 
problem as a bilevel problem for determining paths with minimum total risk and minimum total costs. Bianco and 
Garamia proposed bilevel model for determining paths with minimum total risk while guaranteeing equitable risk 
spreading. Dadkar et al. (2008) and Nielsen et al. (2005) developed K shortest path algorithms for stochastic and 
dynamic networks. Dadkar et al. (2008) focused on problem instances where the distribution of each link attribute is 
continuous whereas Nielsen et al. (2005) focused on problem instances where the distribution of the link attributes is 
discrete with integer values. 
There is substantial interest in research related to transportation and terrorism. To date much of that research has 
focused on identifying what parts of the transportation system are vulnerable to terrorism and initial ideas of what 
should be done about those vulnerabilities. For example, see Szyliowicz and Viotti (1997), Chatterjee et al. (2001), 
Frederickson and LaPorte (2002), and Haimes and Longstaff (2002). Dadkar (2010)develops a game-theoretic 
model of the interactions among government agencies, shippers/carriers and terrorists as a framework for the 
analysis. 
In this paper, we study a fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming for hazmat transportation network design. The 
problem we consider is the following: a hazmat shipment has to be shipped over a road transportation network in 
order to transport a given amount of hazardous materials from a specific origin point to a specific destination. We
design a route to minimize the risks from the natural accident and the uncertainty of a terrorist threat, and develop a 
fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming method to deal with multiple uncertainties presented in terms of fuzzy sets, 
interval values and random variables which representing the probabilities and fatality rates of the terrorist attacking.
Finally, it illustrates the methodology on a case study. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that pays 
particular attention to a fuzzy stochastic model for hazmat transportation with considering the risks from the 
terrorism threat.
3. LINK ATTRIBUTED RISKS
In the most researches, link risks are calculated by natural accident rates timing the number of suffered people 
from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realization of specified hazards. As the terrorist threat 
is growing in resent years, Hazmat shipment has became a new target of terrorist attacks, it is therefore necessary to 
consider terrorism risk into the Hazmat routing model. In this section, we discuss how to define and calculate link 
attributed terrorism risk.
Terrorism risk can be defined as the anticipated consequences over some period of time to a distinct set of 
targets, consequential of a definite set of threats. Therefore threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences play a 
considerable part in the overall terrorism risk. Terrorism Risk can be measured as the expected consequence of an 
existing threat, for a given target, attack mode, and damage type. Since terrorism risk is the product of threat, 
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vulnerability and consequence (Terrorism Risk= Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence).
Terrorism Risk= Probability (attack occurs) X Probability (attack results in damage | attack occurs) X 
Expectation (damage | attack occurs and results in damage). 
So, terrorism risk indicates the expected consequences of attacks considering the possibility of the occurrence 
and success of the terrorist attacks. In terms of probability, a terrorism risk from an attack of a certain type is the 
unconditional expected value of damages of a certain type. Formulating terrorism risk helps in providing an 
approach for comparing and aggregating terrorism risk, and also provides a clear mapping between risk and 
approaches to managing or mitigating terrorism risk.
Usually attack mode is uncertainties and the damages from a certain terrorism type are random, for example, the 
demographic distribution in cities varies during time of day, therefore usually terrorism risk is a random fuzzy 
variables. 
Here Let ^ `nnnnnN ...,,, ,321 ,        ^ `nijnijijijij nnnnC PPPP /,...,/,/,/ 332211 be a set of terrorism attack types and  the set 
of fuzzy terrorism attacks of link  ji, ,  kijkn P/ means the possibility of terrorism attack kn of link  ji, is kijP .
As we know, the terrorism risk of link  ji, ,   Aji , is a fuzzy random variable, that means the total terrorism 
risk of any rout on the network is a fuzzy random variable. 
4. THE FUZZY –STOCHASTIC CONSTRAINT MODEL
Most Hazmat transportation models which has primarily a hard or crisp structure have been developed, which 
means the transportation solutions made by the carriers have to be satisfied with the hard constraints limited by the 
governments, these solutions are considered as unfeasible.  As we talked in the last section, the terrorism risk is a 
fuzzy random variable, so there is impossible to find the best solutions when we consider terrorism attacks into 
Hazmat transportation strategies,  we just care about how to get the reasonable solutions with an aspiration level.
In this section, we develop a new hazmat transportation model to describe the hazmat transportation routing 
problem as a fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming formulation, which means we deal with multiple uncertainties 
presented in terms of fuzzy sets, interval values and random variables which representing the terrorism type and the 
damages of the terrorist attacking.
The hazmat transportation network problem is described as a fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming
formulation, is a graph theoretical problem defined on a directed graph  AVG , where V is the set of vertices, 
and A is the set of arcs of the graph. A vertex corresponds to a road intersection, and an arc corresponds to a road 
segment on the network. A risk
ijr is associated with each arc that represents the natural risk of shipment travelling
from node i to node j ,   Aji , . A risk ijk is associated with each arc that represents the terrorism risk of shipment
travelling from node i to node j which is a fuzzy random variable as we talked in the third section,   Aji , .
Let 1 ijx , if arc  ji, is used in the optimal network, 0 otherwise.
Let   1 tyij , if arc  ji, is available for transportation of hazmat at time t , 0 otherwise.
As we talked in section 3, the terrorism risks are fuzzy random variables since attack mode is uncertainties and 
the damages are random. We define these problems with fuzzy random variables are double uncertainty problems. 
To solve these double uncertainty problems, the follow two definitions are proposed. 
Definition 1: let   Posp ,44ˈ be a possibility space of fuzzy variables, and A is an element of set  4p , then 
^ ` ^ ` ^ ` ANecAPosACr   
2
1
is defined as the creditability measure of A , and ^ ` ^ `eAPosANec  1 is 
the necessity measure of A .
Definition 2: let ^ `ˈn21 ,...,, [[[[  be a set of fuzzy random vectors of the possibility space of fuzzy variables
 Pr,Aˈ: , and mn RRf o: be the creditability function, then:
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In this paper, we develop the fuzzy-stochastic constraint programming model formulation according to definition 
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The objective (1) is to minimize the total risks and costs on the network used by the carriers. Constraints (2) are 
fuzzy random constraints of terrorism attack. Constraints (3) ensure the flow from its origin to destination. 
Constraints (4) ensure that only edges selected by the government can be used by the carriers. Constraints (5) and
(6) are binary requirements on the variables. 
We assume link risks are time-dependent whereas travel time is constant since travel speed is not significantly 
affected by congestion.
The fuzzy stochastic model is similar to the common network flow model, besides considering the terrorism 
attack risk which are fuzzy random, the risk equity of whole road network is concerned too. So the target of the 
proposed fuzzy stochastic model is to search the route with the lowest costs and risks on  D which is satisfied E .
5. HEURISTIC SOLUTION OF THE TIME-DEPENDENT MODEL
The classical heuristics can not be implemented since the model including fuzzy random variables. Considering 
usually we choose a set of routes as the candidates in Hazmat road transportation, we adopt genetic algorithm which 
characterized by parallel and global search. The algorithm follows.
5.1. population initialization and chromosome coding
We adopt natural number coding to construct the genes. Set 0 as depot, 1,2,…,L as road nodes. We generate the 
random numbers which between > @n,1 for the initial population. The more details can be searched in the related 
literatures.
5.2. fitness function and calculation
According to the fuzzy stochastic model in section 4, the fitness function is following:
IJKK  
Here we simulate the fitness on the computer, here the probabilities of the terrorism attack on link  ji, is:
       ^ `nijnijijijij nnnnC PPPP /,...,/,/,/ 332211 
Here we simulate the accidents of the terrorism attack on the computer with N times.
The steps are following
STEP1 set 0 i
STEP2 here we assume the number of the links attacked possibly is m , we generate terrorism attack accidents 
on the possibility space of fuzzy variables on link  ji, (the probability must be greater than 0), calculate the 
probabilities i1P ,
i
2P ,…,
i
mP , and 
iiii
m21 ... PPPP  ;
STEP 3 according to the fatality rates of link  ji, , calculate iijk of ^ ` Etd iijiij kkPr by simulating on the computer, 
to STEP 3.1;
STEP 3.1 we assume the sets of the probability of fatality rates is:
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^ `eeij pkpkpkk ,,...,,,, 2211 
Set the simulation times are sN and 0 j ;
STEP 3.2 if sNj ! , to STEP 3.3; otherwise, generate the random number between 0-1 to the links attacked 
possibly m , and find the correspond fatality rate;
STEP 3.3 sort ^ `iijNiijiij skkk ,...,, 21 , and set the > @ 1x sNE as iijk , to STEP 4;
STEP 4 set 1 nn , if FNn d , to STEP 1, otherwise, define
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Calculate the maximal ijk which is satisfied   PtijkL by dichotomy, which is the fitness of the gene.
5.3. tactics selection
Here we implement the best individual saved tactic and roulette wheel selection. The operator is: array N 
individual of each population according to the fitness. The first is the best individual, according to the best 
individual saved tactic, copy it directly to the next population. Other N-1 individuals of the next population are 
generated by roulette wheel selection according to their fitness of the previous population.
5.4. crossover operation
We adopt OX crossover. The crossover operator is happened on the probability C
P
. Choose The place of the 
crossover is random.
5.5. mutation operation
The mutation operator is happened on the probability m
P
. The swap times J is generated randomly in case the 
mutation operator is happened.
6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES
In this section, we will show the computational results achieved by the proposed fuzzy stochastics model and the 
proposed heuristic algorithm. We implement the heuristic algorithms and solve the network flow problems by 
VC++. We perform all testing on the road networks, which is shown in Fig.1. The road network is composed of 21
effective vertices and 46 arcs, the red links mean the road which could probably attacked by terrorists. The  hazmat 
shipments shipped from the origin point to the destination point. To shorten computing time, we classify roads to 
four categories and the traffic and accident rates are same of every category. There are 3 potential attacking points 
spreading on the network which are located in the 3 links. The probabilities of evolving terrorism attack are shown 
in table 1, and fatality rates are shown in table 2.
Fig. 1. the road network
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Table 1 the probabilities of evolving terrorism attack
link 1n 2n 3n 4n
1 8.0*10-6 1.0*10-5 1.0*10-5 6.0*10-6
2 8.0*10-6 6.0*10-6 3.0*10-6 0.0
3 3.0*10-6 5.0*10-6 0.0 3.0*10-6
Table 2 the fatality rates of evolving terrorism attack
mode Fatality rate(rates, probabilities)
1n (0.1, 0.6),(0.1, 0.2),(0.2, 0.1),(0.6, 0.1)
2n (0.2, 0.1),(0.2, 0.1),(0.1, 0.2),(0.1, 0.6)
3n (0.5, 0.2),(0.6, 0.3),(0.7, 0.3),(0.8, 0.2)
4n (0.7, 0.1),(0.8, 0.1),(0.9, 0.2),(1.0, 0.6)
And in this case, 0.8 D , 0.2 E . And for comparing the solutions calculated by different policies, we 
design three routing polices: the first one represents the routings which would be chosen by minimizing natural risks 
in absence of any terrorism attacking risk-related routing policy; the second one aims to minimize the terrorism 
risks; the third one is the one we proposed in this paper. Table 3 summarizes the implications of these policies.
Table 3 the implication of different polices
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3
Natural risks 7.634*10 8.973*104 7.650*104 4
Terrorism risks 1.423*10 1.271*104 1.271*104 4
Total risks 9.057*10 10.244*104 8.921*104 4
The total population exposure of policy 1 from nature is the most minimum around the three policies while the 
maximum population exposure from terrorism attack is the most maximum since terrorism attack isn’t considered in 
policy 1. terrorism attack risk is same considered in policy 2 and policy 3 , but the population exposure of policy 2 
from nature is higher than policy 3. So we can conclude the terrorism attack risks could be reduced significantly.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed how terrorism attack affects hazmat transportation routing selection and proposed a 
new fuzzy stochastic model for hazmat transportation scheduling problem represents the distinction between the 
risks as the consequence of a natural accident and terrorism attack. We develop a fuzzy-stochastic constraint 
programming method to deal with multiple uncertainties presented in terms of fuzzy sets, interval values and 
random variables which representing the probabilities and fatality rates of the terrorist attacking. Finally, we 
experimented the proposed fuzzy stochastic model and heuristic algorithm on the scenarios of a road network.
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